To fully understand sequential effects on learning in humans, we need a comprehensive theory of cognition. Such a theory should be complete enough to perform the task of interest and to learn like humans while doing so. These theories, called process models or cognitive models, can be broken down into aspects that do not change between tasks -the architecture -and aspects that do change -the knowledge. Where such models have been used to understand sequence effects on learning, they have proven to be very powerful. As an example, we present a model of behavior on a simple task that shows how an appropriate order can lead to significantly (16%) faster learning. However, despite their power, process models remain difficult to apply routinely. In response, we also discuss an alternative approach -abstract models -that may be more appropriate in some contexts.
Introduction
Science is concerned not only with data, as we discussed in the previous chapter, but with models or theories that explain those data. Because human cognition is dynamic and involves change over time, accounts of cognition often take the form of process models, which are sometimes also called cognitive models. In this chapter we review the form such models have taken and their relation to order effects in learning.
We begin by discussing the connection between artificial intelligence (AI) systems (e.g., as reviewed by Cornuéjols, Chapter 3), including those from machine learning and computational models of human behavior, including some illustrations of the latter. After this, we present a computational model of order effects on a cognitive task, cast within a particular but simplified theoretical framework. Next, we explore more broadly the possible sources of order effects within such models, and then briefly consider an alternative approach that models human behavior at a more abstract level. We close with some open problems in the area of modeling order effects and a charge to new modellers.
Process models in cognitive science
Many sciences use process models to explain the behavior of complex, Fortunately, computer languages provide formalisms that can be used to model the symbolic aspects of human cognition in the same way that differential equations are used in physics. Moreover, the field of AI has developed a variety of representations, performance mechanisms, and learning methods that can operate on many of the tasks that confront humans. Some AI work has little relevance to cognitive science because it makes no effort to constrain its methods to match psychological phenomena, but other AI systems have been developed with this goal explicitly in mind, and one can use them as computational models of human behavior. Indeed, some of the earliest AI systems, including EPAM (Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984) and GPS (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1962) fall into this category.
The advantages of formal models
The advantage of formal models over informal ones is the same in cognitive science as in any other field. Rather than being sufficiently vague to handle almost any empirical result, detailed models of the processes that generate behavior lead to specific predictions that can be shown to be incorrect. 1 . Such results can thus lead to improved models that account for problematic findings and that make new predictions, leading to iterative progress towards more complete theories. Formal models also let us examine the internal states and mechanisms in the model that gave rise to the observed behavior, such as order effects. This lets us predict the effects of different conditions, such as alternative orders, without running subjects.
Another advantage of having a model's detailed behavior at hand is that it assists in analysing a subject's behavior. In particular, it lets us partition behavior into portions that the model can explain and those that it cannot, thus identifying anomalous observations. This in turn helps indicate where the model is incorrect and suggests where to improve it.
Finally, a well developed, parameterized model can be used to classify subjects by their characteristics (e.g., Daily, Lovett & Reder, 2001) , providing an account of individual differences.
Types of process models
Before examining how computational models can explain order effects observed in human learning, we must briefly review the major types. Early process models were compared to psychological data, but they incorporated rather idiosyncratic mechanisms and structures that were rarely shared within the research community. Over the past decade, 1 Moreover, AI models actually carry out the tasks they address, which opens many possibilities for applications(e.g., Anderson & Gluck, 2001; Ritter et al., 2003) .
researchers have imposed an increasing number of theoretical constraints across sets of models. These often take the form of cognitive architectures (Newell, 1990) , which posit the structures and mechanisms of the cognitive system that are common across tasks. A cognitive architecture provides a framework for describing the sources of thought and behavior, including order effects.
Although there exist numerous computational models for aspects of cognition like categorization and long-term memory retrieval, we will focus here on frameworks for modeling more complex sequential tasks like problem solving and natural language. One widespread class of architectures used for such tasks is known as production systems (Jones, Ritter & Wood, 2000; Neches, Langley & Klahr, 1987; Young, 1979) . This framework includes a long-term memory that contains productions or condition-action rules, which changes only slowly with learning, and short-term or working memory, which is far more dynamic. What varies across models in this framework is the contents of long-term memory.
A production system operates in cycles, on each step matching its rules against the contents of short-term memory (which may include representations of the environment), selecting one or more rules to apply, using their actions to alter short-term memory or the environment, and then iterating. Various learning methods exist for combining, generalizing, specializing, or otherwise modifying the rules in long-term memory. For example, a common approach involves making a larger rule out of several smaller rules that applied in sequence. This new rule can reduce the load on working memory and increase the speed of processing. If the choice of which smaller rules to apply was learned from extensive problem solving, the new rule can also constitute new knowledge about how to constrain future behavior. Examples of production systems that learn include Pavlik's ACT-R model (Chapter 10) and Ohlsson's HS system (Chapter 11).
A second well-studied framework for modeling sequential behavior is recurrent neural networks (for an introduction see Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2002) . Such models include a long-term memory composed of nodes, directed links connecting nodes, and weights on the links, with short-term memory consisting of temporary activations on the nodes.
What varies across tasks are the number and connectivity of the nodes and the weights on links. Lane (Chapter 5) reviews this approach in more detail. A recurrent network also operates in cycles, on each cycle using the activations on 'input nodes' (at the lowest level) and the weight of links to compute the activations of higher-level nodes, ultimately calculating activation levels for output nodes that determine actions. The activations for some higher level nodes then replace those for the input nodes, and the next cycle begins. Learning typically occurs by propagating errors (differences between the desired and output values) downward through the network and modifying the weights to reduce these errors in the future.
Although production systems and recurrent neural networks are not the only classes of models used to model sequential human behavior, they are certainly the most widely used. Other architectural frameworks, including case-based and probabilistic ones, differ in their assumptions about representation, knowledge retrieval, and learning, but can be described using the terms of cognitive architecture and knowledge.
Indeed, the most remarkable aspect of these architectures is not their differences but their similarities. All operate in cycles, in some sense matching against the contents of memory, taking actions to alter it, and then repeating the process. Their learning methods, despite their differences in operation, also tend to give similar effects, such as mastering simpler structures before more complex ones. We will return to this observation later in the chapter.
A simple model of order effects
An example model that produces an order effect in learning will clarify how one can use a cognitive architecture to understand human behavior and ground the rest of the discussion in more concrete terms. We first present the model's structure and mechanisms, after which we explain its behavior on a simple task that shows how order effects can arise.
We will assume that the example model is based upon a simple architecture that incorporates ideas from two existing frameworks, notably Soar (Newell, 1990) and ACT-R (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere & Qin, 2004) . Figure 1 shows the components of this generic architecture, which includes a long-term memory encoded as production rules, which matches against the current goal stack and the contents of short-term memory. The rules are strengthened when they match or when they resolve problems within the goal stack, such as achieving or filling in some goal. A structural learning mechanism adds new rules to long-term memory, which alters future performance.
The simple lights and buttons task
To illustrate some of these concepts, consider a task that involves pushing buttons underneath lights that are on. A simple version uses four lights and four buttons, two per hand. If a light is on, the subject presses the corresponding button, as shown in Figure 2 . In total, there are 16 different patterns of lights that require 16 different responses, assuming that not pushing all four buttons is a possible response. Seibel (1963) , who studied a more complex version of this task, found that subjects become faster at this task the longer they practiced it. 
The model
Our model in the prototypical architecture assumes a hierarchical decomposition of the task and of the knowledge to perform it. To master the task with both hands, subtask for each hand, mastery for each button must be achieved; to master a button, the light must be checked and the appropriate action done to the button (pressed if the light is lit, or not pressed if it is off). Figure 3 depicts this organisation by grouping the lights by pairs. We have based this simple model on a previous one (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981; Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987) .
The model predicts that the time taken to press the appropriate lights depends on the production rules available in long-term memory, and also that learning occurs in a cumulative manner, in that combined responses across fingers can be acquired only when the subresponses are known. The lowest level response, for an individual light, is atomic and thus always known. Learning combined responses requires acquiring new rules denoted by nodes e, f, and g in Figure 3 . At the outset, the first set of lights thus takes a total of seven steps. The model takes one step to do each of the four lights, one step to compose each of the two pairs, and one Table 1 gives an example of an efficient and less efficient learning sequence for the task. In general, the most efficient approach for this architecture on this task, at least with this knowledge and representation, is to keep the learning mechanism busy. Less efficient sequences let the subtasks be repeated without learning, particularly precluding higher level learning occurring. For example, when the remaining eight unseen items are presented, the learner with the bad sequence must be shown three additional trials to catch up with the efficient sequence, giving a total of 19 instead of 16 trials, which amounts to a 16% slower learning rate. Despite the simplicity of both task and model, they are complex enough to exhibit order effects. Moreover, the task is similar to many others that occur in the real world in which component knowledge must be mastered before more advanced knowledge can be acquired. This effect can be found in existing Soar models of job shop scheduling (Nerb, Ritter, & Krems, 1999) , blood typing (Johnson, Krems, & Amra, 1994) , circuit troubleshooting (Ritter & Bibby, 2001) , and language acquisition (Lewis, 1998 ).
This simple example shows that several things-the structure of the task, the internal representation, the performance process, the order of stimuli, and the learning mechanism-interact to create order effects. A complete account of such effects must specify each of these components.
Aspects of process models that can explain order effects
Ideally, process models do not just explain but also predict data, including the effects of training order. A well-crafted computational account of human behavior can suggest novel conditions under which phenomena of interest occur. One advantage of casting models within a constrained theory of the cognitive architecture is that they are more likely to produce such predictions.
Order effects can also arise from processing that leaves changes in the process model's state or mechanisms that interact with later processing like soap left on poorly rinsed pots that influence later cooking. In this section we consider five possible factors within cognitive architectures that can explain and predict such effects: (a) forgetting, (b) not forgetting, (c) memory overload, (d) changes to the internal processes, and (e) time constraints that arise in rapidly changing environments. Undoubtedly, other sources of explanation are possible, but these seem likely to account for many cases in which training order influences learning.
Forgetting
Order effects can occur whenever structures cannot be retrieved later, say, Many learning models rely on the cooccurence of elements in dynamic memories. For example, the composition mechanism in ACT-R (Anderson, 1993; Jones et al., 2000) uses information about the elements matched by successively applied rules to create a new rule. Similarly, the chunking mechanism in Soar (Newell, 1990 ) uses dependencies among elements in working memory before and after it solves a problem to determine the content of new production rules. Finally, recurrent neural networks (Elman, 1989) change weights on links only to the extent that the nodes from which they emanate were active. Factors that influnce the retrieval of either of such pairs will also influence learning.
Einstellung (not forgetting)
Another source of order effects is reliance on strategies that have proved successful in the past. Once a person has found some way to solve a problem, he often continues to utilize the same solution even when other responses may work better in new situations. Such Einstellung behavior occurs more often when the person encounters problems in certain orders.
The classical example for such effects are sequences of arithmetical water jar puzzles. Luchins (1942) showed that, depending on the order in which subjects solved such problems, subjects used more or less efficient strategies to solve later problems (for a more recent demonstration of the effect see Luchins & Luchins, 1991) . If an individual is given a series of problems (Set A) for which he acquires a strategy that works, he tends to use the same strategy on other problems (Set B) even when a simpler solution is possible. However, if a person is presented with problems from Set B first, he nearly always finds the more elegant solution.
Cognitive scientists have developed a number of process models for
Einstellung that incorporate various learning mechanisms. These composing sets of production rules into larger ones (Neves & Anderson, 1981) and analogical reasoning based on earlier solutions (Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Jones & Langley, in press ). Scheiter and Gerjets (Chapter 14) examine a related concept. What these models have in common are methods that create new long-term structures from individual experiences, which they then prefer to utilize in new situations rather than carrying out search for more efficient solutions.
Cognitive overload
A third factor that can underlie effects of training order is cognitive load.
Sweller ( , 1994 has developed the most extensive theory of how demands on working memory affect problem solving and learning. His account provides a framework for investigations into instructional design by considering both the structure of information and the cognitive processes that let learners interpret that information. The theory assumes that working memory demands stem from three additive sources: the material being learned (intrinsic cognitive load); the manner in which information is presented (extraneous or ineffective load); and resources devoted to learning and automation (germane or effective cognitive load).
In this framework, a well-designed learning sequence maximizes resources that can be devoted to germane cognitive load. Intrinsic cognitive load depends on the complexity of the material being learned, being high if relevant elements interact with each other and low if they can be learned independently. Effective instructional design therefore minimizes extraneous cognitive load during learning, as well as the load from interfaces themselves. In series of studies, Sweller and his colleagues have shown how different cognitive loads imposed by external structuring (including ordering) of tasks can facilitate or hinder learning. Of crucial interest here are the kinds and timing of instructions and learning aids that will encourage effective learning (Bass, Baxter & Ritter, 1995) .
A further source for order effects within this framework has to with intrinsic cognitive load, which was initially considered as given and static as well as irreducible. A more recent view, however, assumes that intrinsic cognitive load may itself be a function of the task-subject interaction. In Intelligence (e.g., Cañamero & Hudlicka, 2004; Minsky, in prep.; Norman, Ortony & Russell, 2003; Picard, 1997; Silverman, 2004) . As a result of these efforts, some computational models about the role of emotions during reasoning and problem solving have emerged; example models are Cathexis (Velásquez, 1998) , EMA (Gratch & Marsella, 2004) , HOTCO (Thagard, 2003) , and DEBECO (Nerb, 2004) . None of these models are concerned explicitly with order effects. However, order effects in learning will result if within these models emotions have lingering effects on cognitive mechanims. Altogether, this is a fascinating new development and a growing field of research that has huge potential for changing the study of learning and problem solving (Kort, Reilly & Picard, 2001 ).
Changes to internal processes

Time constraints in rapidly changing environments
The order in which a learner attempts tasks is often important in highly interactive, externally paced environments that require timely responses.
If the situation is novel enough or if the response is complicated enough, he will not be able to respond before the situation changes and he loses a chance to learn from that context. For example, in video games, the player must hit a target before it disappears. If he does do not accomplish this in time, then he may not be able to acquire even a partial response and the task can remain impossible.
One way to avoid this problem is to change the order of tasks. If the learner encounters easier situations before harder ones, then he will be able to respond more often and thus able to learn from the outcomes.
Moreover, learning on easy tasks can reduce the time needed to respond in more complicated situations, thus allowing responses and learning on them as well. For this reason, such part-task training, which presents component tasks before the complete task, is a common approach to training in real-time environments (Donchin, 1989) .
This account predicts part-task training would be beneficial in the lights and buttons domain if the button pushes had a deadline. When a task required pushing many buttons, a novice would not initially be able to respond in time. However, presenting tasks that involve single light, followed by those with pairs of lights, and so forth up to the full set would allow learning on early trials. This approach would support learning on the later trials because the partial responses would be available for combination into more complex ones.
From concrete models to abstract models
As we have seen, process models in cognitive science typically take the form of a running AI system that performs some task, and that also is constrained to carry our the task in much the same way as humans.
However, two problems can arise with this approach that can be solved by using a somewhat different form of process model.
The first problem is the difficulty in creating a complete AI model, which is not always straightforward. Developing a system that performs the task requires that one specify a complete algorithm and a way for the model to interact with the task. The modeler must have substantial programming skills. The model must also be run, which is usually straightforward, but which can be time consuming if one applies it to a wide range of tasks or if one desires expected or average behavior. One may also have to interpret or code the results of the model's behavior.
The second problem is that, in order to develop a complete, running model, one must often make arbitrary assumptions about structures or processes that have no theoretical content. Even when the model fits the data well, its success may not be due to its core theoretical assumptions but rather to its arbitrary components. An example of this occurred with context effects in letter perception, where the encoding of the stimuli by the modellers appears to have been more important than the processes used in the model itself (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Richman & Simon, 1989) .
A response to these difficulties is to develop an abstract process model of the phenomena. Unlike the 'concrete' information processing models we have been discussing, an abstract model makes fewer commitments about structures and processes, which means that it cannot actually perform the task, but rather represents behavior at a coarser level.
Whereas concrete models characterize what the human will do and the reasons, abstract models are often used to predict quantitative measures such as the time to make choices and how much is learned.
Cognitive scientists have developed abstract models of learning and problem solving (Atwood & Polson, 1976; Ohlsson, 1995; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) , sensory-motor behavior (Langley, 1996) , categorization (Langley, 1999) , and decision making (Young, 1998) , but one of the earliest is due to Rosenbloom and Newell (1987) for the lights and buttons (Seibel) task described above. They initially presented a concrete production system model to explain the power law of practice (how reaction times decrease with practice but at a decreasing rate). For reasons of computational efficiency, they used a abstract model based on the production system model to compute the reaction times for a series of trials for comparison with the human data.
Abstract models can be much easier to use. Later work by Ritter (1988) utilized another abstract model to compute the expected value for each trial on this task. In each case, the predictions of the abstract model were easier to manipulate, and could be derived around 100,000 times faster (five seconds vs. 100 runs × 5 hours per run × 3,600 seconds/hour), than the concrete rule-based model that actually performed the task.
One drawback of abstract models as typically used is that they average over different training sequences and thus cannot account for order effects. However, there is nothing inherent in the abstract approach that forces such averaging over all tasks. If one's goal is average learning curves, they may be the only practical way to achieve this end. For example, Nerb, Ritter, and Krems (1999) report a concrete model of behavior on more complex problem-solving task that provides reasonable timing predictions for sequences of problems for individual subjects. Each trial takes over a minute to run, with learning taking place over a sequence of 25 trials, and a hundred runs would be required to achieve reliable average. An abstract modeling approach could achieve this result far more efficiently.
To illuminate this point, let us consider an abstract model that captures the essential features of the concrete lights and buttons model.
Rather than running the concrete model repeatedly to compute the expected average time across trials for the first two test trials, Trials 9 and 10, we can compute the expected time assuming a uniform distribution of all the possible stimuli.
As shown at the top of Table 2 , the efficient sequence starts with a better knowledge base. It can recognize each of two-light patterns and a quarter of the four-light patterns. The inefficient sequence can recognize all the sub patterns, but not as many larger patterns. In trial 9, the efficient sequence has a greater chance of applying a four-light pattern than the inefficient sequence. The inefficient sequence, on the other hand, has a greater chance to learn a new pattern. This effect carries into trial 10. With repeated trials, the two will converge, with the more efficient sequence always being faster, but by an ever decreasing amount.
This abstract model provides several lessons. First, it illustrates how seemingly similar but theoretically different sequences can lead to different learning. Second, it illustrates how an abstract model can be used, and how easily they can be used to represent a process model and its predictions.
Concluding remarks
Although process models of human behavior, including learning, have existed for almost five decades, considerable work still remains. In closing,
we briefly consider some open questions with respect to computational models of order effects that the reader may wish to explore on his own.
Experimental tests of predictions
One advantage of process models is that they let one make predictions about behavior in new situations, which can then suggest additional experiments that can either support or disconfirm the model. Some useful activities of this sort would include: • Identify aspects of a process model that explain order effects (as discussed in section 4) and design experiments that vary task characteristics to determine which aspects are responsible. Such studies can lead to gradual refinement of process models that can make increasingly specific predictions.
• Identify situations in which a process model indicates that the learner's background knowledge will mitigate or eliminate order effects and design experiments to test this prediction. Such studies can reveal more information about the role of expertise in learning than experiments focusing on simple novice to expert transitions. In the lights and buttons task, one might expect pianists to exhibit weaker order effects because they have extensive knowledge about keys.
Of course, these types of experiments are not specific to the study of order effects; they can be equally useful in understanding other aspects of human behavior. But the empirical study of sequencing has been so rare, in particular in the context of evaluating process models, that they seem especially worthwhile.
Developing models and architectures
Because there are relatively few process models of order effects, another important activity is the creation and refinement of such models. Some likely work of this sort would include:
• Identify a simple order effect and develop a model that explains it.
For example, create a model that explains the benefits of part-task training (Mane & Donchin, 1989) , which emphasises teaching the component skills of a task before teaching how to integrate them.
After creating the model, consider what suggestions it makes for instruction in the area. The model need not be concrete, but it should be clear enough to predict implications like relative learning rates.
• Identify an order effect that has not yet been explained and develop a concrete process model that explains it within an existing architectural framework. An even better approach would involve modelling the effect within different architectures and, if they share underlying features, designing an abstract model that subsumes them.
• Identify places in an existing architecture where introduction of resource or timing limitations would suggest new order effects, then develop concrete models that instantiate this prediction for a specific task or set of tasks.
Again, these types of activities apply to any class of psychological phenomena, but order effects have received so little attention that they seem an especially fertile area to use in constructing and constraining our theories of the human cognitive architecture.
General advice
In addition to the above suggestions on open problems in the study of order effects, we can offer some general advice to erstwhile cognitive modellers. First, we encourage researchers to select a theoretical framework, ideally one that takes a clear position on the nature of the human cognitive architecture, and to develop models within that framework. If researchers are new to the area, then they should not work in isolation, but rather attach themselves to a scientist or group experienced with using that framework. At the same time, they should not focus their attention on this framework to the exclusion of all others;
understanding alternative theories and their relation to one's own is also part of the scientific process.
Second, computational modellers should also remember that it is essential to relate their systems to phenomena. A model should always make contact with observations of some sort. Moreover, like other disciplines, cognitive science operates not by attempting to confirm its theories, but rather by gaining insights about ways to improve them (Grant, 1962) . The construction, evaluation, and analysis of process models is an important means to this end.
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